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_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
STEARNS, District Judge. 
 George Martorano was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole after pleading guilty to 
nineteen counts related to the wholesale distribution of 
drugs.  In this appeal, Martorano raises two issues: 
whether the District Court imposed an illegal general 
sentence; and whether his undifferentiated sentence for 
conspiring to distribute drugs and supervising a 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) violates the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  We will affirm the District 
Court. 
BACKGROUND 
On September 19, 1983, a federal grand jury 
handed up an indictment accusing Martorano of 
distributing large quantities of cocaine, 
methamphetamine, methaqualone, and marijuana.  On 
June 4, 1984, Martorano pled guilty to all nineteen counts 
of the indictment, including conspiracy to distribute 
narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 
supervising a CCE, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.  On 
April 26, 1988, after intervening proceedings, Martorano 
was sentenced to a general sentence of life imprisonment 
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without parole.
1
  Since 1988, Martorano‟s sentence has 
been reviewed by various district court judges and panels 
of this Court in response to a succession of post-
conviction motions.
2
  Presently before this panel is 
Martorano‟s appeal from the District Court‟s denial of a 
motion filed pursuant to former Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 35(a).  The District Court had jurisdiction over 
the Rule 35(a) motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and 
we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                                 
 
1
 Martorano states that he is “believed to be the 
longest serving first-time offender for a nonviolent 
offense” – having now served nearly 30 years of 
imprisonment.  Appellant‟s Br. at 9.  Martorano notes 
that he had no prior criminal record, and that the 
government did not seek a sentence of life imprisonment 
at his sentencing hearing.  He further avers that “when he 
was sentenced in 1984, the U.S. Probation Officer‟s 
Parole Guideline Worksheet prepared by the probation 
officer responsible for [his] Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report provided that [his] parole guidelines dictated a 
parole guideline of between 40-52 months.”  Id. at 22. 
2
 The lengthy procedural history of this case is ably 
described in United States v. Martorano, No. 83–314–1, 
2007 WL 3071620 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2007) (denying an 
earlier motion by Martorano to correct his sentence under 
Rule 35(a)). 
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DISCUSSION 
Former Rule 35(a) provided that “the court may 
correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time 
provided herein for the reduction of sentence.”  When 
applicable, Rule 35(a) places on the defendant the burden 
of proving the illegality of his sentence.
3
  United States v. 
Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1993).  This Court‟s 
review of a district court‟s denial of a Rule 35(a) motion 
is plenary “since the legality of the sentence imposed by 
the district court is being challenged.”  Id. at 673 (citing 
United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 
1991)). 
We have long expressed (as have other circuit 
                                                 
3
 As the District Court noted, “former Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 35(a) . . . is available to individuals whose 
offenses were committed prior to November 1, 1987.  In 
June of 1984, Mr. Martorano pleaded guilty to a number 
of offenses he had theretofore committed.  Thus, the 
former Rule 35(a) is available to him.  That Rule allowed 
an individual to bring a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence at any time.  Because Mr. Martorano‟s motion 
addresses only the former Rule 35(a), references to Rule 
35(a) in this Memorandum are to the former Rule.”  
United States v. Martorano, No. 83–314–1, 2011 WL 
2631817, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011).  Such is also 
the case here. 
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courts) a strong preference for multiple, as opposed to 
general, sentences, but without ever holding general 
sentences to be illegal per se.
4
  See United States v. Rose, 
215 F.2d 617, 630 (3d Cir. 1954) (“In sentencing the 
defendant the trial judge imposed a „lump‟ sentence on 
the 5-count indictment instead of dealing with each count 
separately. While there exist divergent views on the 
subject of such form of sentencing we are strongly of the 
opinion that it is highly desirable that the trial judge in 
imposing sentence on an indictment containing more than 
one count deal separately with each count.”); United 
States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971) (en 
banc) (“We are aware that this Court has, for good 
reason, expressed a dissatisfaction with general sentences 
and has declared it „highly desirable that the trial judge in 
imposing sentence on an indictment containing more than 
                                                 
4
  Some of the potential pitfalls of a general 
sentence were explained in United States v. Peeke, 153 F. 
166 (3d Cir. 1907). In Peeke, the Court held that a five-
year general sentence for a term longer than the 
maximum sentence authorized for one of several offenses 
of conviction was void to the extent of the excess, noting 
that “[s]hould some newly discovered evidence induce 
the executive to pardon the prisoner on one or more 
counts, how would it be possible to ascertain to what part 
of the sentence the pardon applied?  To what reduction 
from the five-year term would be entitled?  To state these 
questions is to answer them.”  Id. at 168. 
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one count deal separately with each count.‟” (quoting 
Rose)).  
Martorano, however, argues that his sentence is 
now made illegal by this Court‟s more recent decision in 
United States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2010).  In 
Ward, the defendant had been given a general sentence of 
twenty-five years, a sentence that exceeded the statutory 
maximum sentence for three of the five counts to which 
he had pled guilty.  On appeal, the Ward Court vacated 
the sentence and remanded the case, stating: 
[w]e do not know whether the [District] 
Court intended to impose a 25 year sentence 
on each count to run concurrently – which 
would clearly be illegal considering the 
statutory maximums on certain counts – or 
whether the [District] Court had some other 
sentence in mind, and, accordingly, we 
cannot adequately review the sentence.  We 
will therefore remand for resentencing.  
Ward, 626 F.3d at 184-85. 
Martorano‟s general sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole exceeds the statutory maximum for 
eighteen of the nineteen counts to which he pled guilty 
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(the CCE count being the exception).
5
  Thus, as the 
District Court reasoned, Martorano‟s case is “partially 
analogous to Ward, in which the general sentence 
imposed by the district court exceeded the maximum 
permitted sentence for three of the five counts to which 
the defendant had pled guilty, but did not exceed the 
maximum for two others.”  Martorano, 2011 WL 
2631817, at *2.  The District Court, however, concluded 
that Ward did not apply to Martorano‟s case because 
“Ward does not clearly establish the illegality of a 
general sentence outside of the context of the Sentencing 
Guidelines . . . .”6  Id., at *3.  
We agree with the District Court‟s distillation of 
the holding in Ward. The decision in Ward turned on the 
unmistakable proscription of general sentences by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  “Section 5G1.2 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines indicate that sentencing courts 
                                                 
5
 At the time of Martorano‟s sentencing, conviction 
under the CCE statute was punishable by a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  
 
6
 The Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to 
offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987.  See 
United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 
1989).  Therefore, they have no application to 
Martorano‟s case.   
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must impose a sentence on each count.”  Ward, 626 F.3d 
at 184 (emphasis added).  Given the clarity of Section 
5G1.2‟s prohibitory language, the Ward Court gave little 
shrift to the government‟s argument that earlier cases 
gave to sanction general sentences in instances in which a 
claim of Double Jeopardy might come into play.  In a 
footnote to Ward, the Court dismissed the argument, 
observing that 
[t]he cases upon which the government 
relies, United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 
1292 (3d Cir. 1993), United States v. 
Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(en banc), and Jones v. Hill, 71 F.2d 932 (3d 
Cir. 1934)[,] did not concern the Sentencing 
Guidelines and are inapposite here.  To the 
extent those cases can be read as permitting 
a general sentence on multiple convictions 
to cure a Double Jeopardy problem, the 
Supreme Court has since rejected such an 
approach.  See Rutledge v. United States, 
517 U.S. 292, 307 (1996) (requiring vacatur 
of conviction on one of two counts held to 
constitute “same” offense).   
Martorano nonetheless seizes on the word “and” in 
the first sentence of footnote 8.  “The cases upon which 
the government relies . . . did not concern the Sentencing 
Guidelines and are inapposite here.” (Emphasis added).  
He argues that the word “and” should be read in the 
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conjunctive as indicating that the Ward Court found the 
three cited cases to be inapposite for reasons other than 
the fact that they are  not Guidelines cases.  However, we 
agree with the District Court that “[t]his 
hypercompartmentalized reading . . . belies the more 
obvious interpretation of the passage,” that as far as the 
Ward Court was concerned, non-Guidelines cases had no 
bearing on the issue that was before it – the validity of 
general sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines.
7
 
Martorano next argues that his general sentence for 
conspiring to distribute drugs and supervising a CCE can 
be interpreted as imposing concurrent sentences for both 
of those crimes, in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  In support of this argument, Martorano cites 
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996), which 
held that the crime of conspiracy to distribute drugs in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 is a lesser included offense 
of supervising a CCE in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 and, 
therefore, a district court may not sustain two convictions 
and impose separate sentences, even concurrent separate 
sentences, on both offenses.  See Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 
307 (concluding that „“[o]ne of [petitioner‟s] convictions, 
as well as its concurrent sentence, is unauthorized 
                                                 
7
 The most that might be wrung from these cases is 
that prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, general 
sentences had come into great disfavor, but were not 
illegal. 
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punishment for a separate offense‟ and must be 
vacated.”).  However, as the District Court stated 
(echoing footnote 8 in Ward), 
[i]f this Court were to apply Rutledge to this 
case, as Mr. Martorano has requested, it is 
hardly certain that it would have any impact 
on Mr. Martorano‟s sentence.  As noted 
above, Mr. Martorano‟s CCE offense carried 
a maximum sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole.  This is the sentence that he 
received.  There is nothing in Rutledge or 
any other case cited by Mr. Martorano that 
would indicate that the appropriate means of 
correcting his sentence under Rutledge 
would be to vacate his CCE sentence as 
opposed to vacating his sentence for the 
lesser included offense of conspiracy.  
Indeed, logically, such a result would be 
inconsistent with the very concept of a 
“lesser included offense.”  
Martorano, 2011 WL 2631817, at *3 n.14.  We agree 
with the District Court that Martorano‟s Rutledge 
argument is futile. 
  In a final salvage effort, Martorano argues for a 
retroactive application of the Ward decision to his case: 
“Ward does not announce a new rule of law . . . . Rather, 
in this circuit and other circuits, there is a long line of 
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cases recognizing that general sentences like that 
imposed upon Mr. Martorano are improper and illegal.”8  
Appellant‟s Reply at 10.  We agree with Martorano to the 
extent that Ward did not create a new rule of law; it 
simply pointed to a binding procedural rule established 
by the Sentencing Guidelines.  The fact remains that 
                                                 
8
 Martorano argues that even if this Court were to 
find that Ward announced a new rule categorically 
banning general sentences, we need not independently 
consider the issue of its retroactivity because the instant 
Rule 35(a) motion is a motion in the original case 
undertaken as a direct appeal, and is therefore not a 
collateral attack.  See Appellant‟s Br. at 19 (“[W]here a 
defendant relies upon a new case in support of his former 
Rule 35(a) motion to correct his illegal sentence, the new 
case must be considered by the court without the need for 
any analysis of whether that new case should be 
retroactive.”) (citing United States v. Shillingford, 586 
F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1978)).  The District Court 
rejected this argument, stating: “[w]hether or not this is 
an accurate summary of Shillingford, this is not the law 
in the Third Circuit.” Martorano, 2011 WL 2631817, at 
*2 n.12 (citing Woods, 986 F.2d at 681 (holding that a 
new Supreme Court opinion did not apply retroactively 
to the defendant‟s sentence because he had not shown 
that he suffered “a complete miscarriage of justice”)).  
We agree with the District Court‟s analysis. 
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Martorano was sentenced prior to the adoption of the 
Guidelines; thus neither Section 5G1.2 nor Ward have 
any application to his case. 
While we remain of the opinion that general 
sentences have out-lived their usefulness, Martorano has 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating an entitlement 
to relief.  We have never held that, in the pre-Guidelines 
context, general sentences are per se illegal.  And we 
agree with the District Court that Ward did not change 
the result in Martorano‟s case.9     
 Consequently, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
                                                 
9
  United States v. Peeke, the century-old case cited 
by Martorano, could be read to the contrary.  However, 
subsequently in Jones v. Hill, decided in 1934, we 
specifically rejected the quoted dicta in Peeke and noted 
that “[t]he great weight of authority in the federal courts 
holds that . . . a general or gross sentence may be 
imposed . . . so long as it does not exceed the aggregate 
of the punishments that could have been imposed on the 
several counts.”  71 F.2d at 932. 
